As the USA prepare to vote, I'd like to take a moment to comment on the
other momentous decision to be taken in the Western world before the end of this year - the proposed start of negotiations with Turkey for its entry into the European Union (EU).
This decision is due at the next summit of Heads of State on December 17, following
the favorable recommendation made by the European Commission on October 6. Despite strong reservations in various European countries (see this
good summary (in French) of the debate in France, it is likely that the decision will be taken to start the negotiation process, leading in all likelihood to Turkish membership sometime between 2015 and 2020.
This (pdf)
document provides a good overview of the impact of accession in various fields (voting rights, FDI, economic impact, immigration, agricultural subsidies) which shows clearly that the impact is more likely to be political than economic.
This
internal EC document (again, pdf) on the impact of enlargement provides the following table:
Enlargement Change in surface population GDP
EU15->EU25 +23% +20% +5%
EU27->EU28* +18% +15% +2%
(*EU27 is EU 25 + Bulgaria and Romania, expected to join the EU soon, Turkey would thus be 28. Croatia is likely to join before but is not included here).
The economic cost is real, but manageable. The political impact is much less predictable and has thus been the main topic of debate. (For American readers, remember that this is not like Mexico joining NAFTA, this is more like Mexico joining the USA as States n°51 thru n°58, with corresponding voting rights, representatives in Congress and so forth).
The main arguments have been the following:
From the Europhile perspective
Europhile here means those favorable to the continued growth of federal political power through the European institutions (the Commission and Parliament), reduced national vetoes, and an increasingly assertive "EU" role in foreign affairs, taxation, etc.
Favorable
- Turkey will provide additional muscle to Europe, thanks to his fast growing population, strong army and potential for growth
- Turkey's borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria will force Europe to become more involved in the Middle East and to beef up its joint policies in foreign affairs
- Turkey's accession will be a shining example of Europe's "soft power" (conflict-resolution via trade and negotiation rather than the use of force), thus ensuring growing positive influence on other neighboring countries, including in the Mediteranean basin and the Middle East, by encouraging them to move towards democracy and market-based economies, with the perpective of closer trade and/or political relations with the EU. It will be also a strong message that Western values are compatible with Islam and that the Western world is not closed to Muslim countries.
- it will be the confirmation that "Europe" is a concept based on shared values and not on geography, thus sending out an optimistic message to the world, showing Europe's confidence in its values and openness to others.
Against
- Turkey is not a part of Europe as a political concept; it should be offered a priviledged status as an associate State but not a seat at the main table of countires whose goal is "ever closer Union" (as per the Rome Treaty which created the European Community in 1957)
- more specifically, the arrival of a large, backward country, largely Middle-Eastern will totally disrupt the decision-processes in the European institutions, making it impossible to find consensus on anything, paralysing the already-strained decision-making process, thus ensuring that Europe becomes little more than a free trade area and an (expensive) ineffectual talking shop
- the cost of bringing in a poor country (whose average GDP per head is only a fourth of the average European level) will be a drag on Europe's resources, preventing it from concentrating its energy on common projects
- the strain of dealing with new Middle East borders at a time when common institutions are not yet in place creates the risk of internal tensions between members which could lead to acrimonious dispute, tension (on a scale even worse than shown last year about Iraq) and thus internal paralysis and possibly the destruction of the existing framework
From the Eurosceptic perspective
Eurosceptic describes here those that are opposed to further European integration, favor the power of Nation States versus the "federal" institutions. They are usually nationalist, but may disagree vehemently on economic issues (some support Europe as an open free-trade area, some are dead against what they see as a purely "capitalist" project)
Favorable
- The inclusion of Turkey in Europe is a positive sign to the world that Islam is compatible with Western values, that a muslim country can be a democracy and a market-based economy and can be accepted as a full-fledged member of "the West"
- Bringing in Turkey will ensure the death of the excessive influence of France and Germany on Europe, ensuring that other view points are represented and heard; in particular it is hoped that Turkey's entry would make the EU more pro-American
- Turkey's entry will bring much needed dynamysm into Europe, thanks to its growing population (compensating the decline in the rest of Europe) and potential for growth
Against
- Turkey is not part of Europe; as an Asian and Muslim country it does not share values or geography with the rest of Europe and thus has nothing to do within Europe's main club
- The risk of massive immigration, increasing influence of islam, involvement in intractable problems at Turkey's borders in the East should not be added to Europe's existing woes
- The cost of bringing in Turkey will force to increase taxes, will cause unemployment and will lead to further growth of the Brussels bureaucracy
As can be seen, some of the arguments are not linked to Turkey's accession per se, but about its likely consequences on the functioning of the European Union. Some of the these arguments are perfectly symmetric and reflect optimism/pessimism on the future ability of Europe to adapt its institutions and to be open to its neighbors in a complex period of rapid economic change, international tension.
Personally, I am a Europhile and favorable to Turkey's accession into Europe. I think that the economic cost will be easily borne by Europe (the reasonable rule that European transfers should never be above 4% of the receiving country's GDP each year ensures that), and that the accession process will provide an amazing boost to Turkey's economy and to its democracy. Immigration is an overblown fear; in fact the example of Spain and Portugal shows that population actually moves
back as the prospects in the home country imporve. The big question is that od the future of European institutions. I am actually confident that Turkey's presence into the "meat grinder" of Brussels' bureaucracy and the inertia of such bureaucracy will ensure Europe's growing assertiveness and presence in more and more areas, including on the diplomatic and military scenes; the risk of political paralysis exists, but it is not enough in my view to balance the positive message - optimistic, peaceful and responsible - sent to the world by welcoming the Turks in.
(In reply to RGiap over at MoA)
I think it is misguided to blame all evil in the world on the US or its leaders. I don't deny all the ugly things that have been part of US policy (although I must confess I am really surprised to see Solidarosc - the Polish one - as part of that ugliness), but I cannot let pass the fact that you seem to say that this is the only source of evil/ugliness in our world, because it is clearly not.
I know we are on opposite sides of the fence on this, but I'd still say that the US (and the West in general) is one of the most benign forms of dominant power, and it was in particular more benign than all forms of communism pushed by Russia and China (now maybe you also count this as part of Western domination...). I agree that we should set our standards higher than Stalin or Mao, but your posts are so heated that this basic fact (Stalin was worse) seems forgotten.
The reason I am optimistic these days, and upbeat about the US/the West is that our system does not eliminate the possibility of evil - it makes it easier to fight it if it appears. The most vociferous critics of all the misguided US policies of the past half-century came from within the US itself and they prevailed (and for instance John Kerry was instrumental in that process re the Vietnam war, which is one of the reasons I have a lot of respect for him). The lessons from that pretty recent part, as well as current trends within the US lead me to my upbeat diagnosis that the current cancer in the White House is going to be voted out and thouroughly discredited. This is the force of our systems - not that our mistakes are somehow smaller, but that we correct these mistakes faster and end up being stronger for it. If this does not come to pass on Nov. 2, then I agree, we're fucked, and I will let you rant until you run out of breath...
To comment on the extremism vs moderation / passion vs. reason theme, I must say tht I have sadly come to the unpleasant conclusion that it is the extremists that get results when serious change is needed. They bring the issues on the table and force change on the unwilling status quo. Ask kindly and you will be ignored. Of course, at the end of the process, you need credible moderates to actually get to an agreement with the other side...
@ Jérôme
As always, a well-thought out and incisive contribution.
I guess it's important to set the parameters of "moderation" versus "passion" and the their relative efficacity in producing "serious change".
I think that often the changes induced by "true believers" while superficially revolutionary are, in fact, also heavily freighted with an unconscious continuation of the status quo ante. The French, Russian and Chinese revolutions were nothing if not radical in their attempts to root out ancient injustices and illusions, and for that surely are "globally" positive movements in their initial ideals, but each of them also carried within the seeds of involution and degeneration (as, of course, does any human enterprise). Perhaps France is still split between those who think the Revolution went to far, and those who think it didn't go far enough but at least the dialectic is now pretty tame compared to trundling of nobles off to the guillotine. The kind of revolution that I approve of without reservation (well,almost) are those like what has happened in Italy over the last 60 years, and more generally that which is still in progress in Western Europe with its (far from perfect) project at consensual unification and federalist democracy. These are revolutions from the bottom up, produced by people working daily to create and come to terms with their evolving realities, although the contributions of statesman who knew enough to try to create the favorable "initial conditions" were also indispensable. This is a variation on a theme dear to Max Weber: the constant dialectic between the "charismatic" and the "bureaucratic".
Posted by: Hannah K. O'Luthon | October 23, 2004 04:06 AM
@Hannah
thanks for the response on the passion vs reason theme. In my view, there is this association passion/extremism/power vs the reason/moderation/negotiation; which these days I also associate with USA vs Europe: the army solution vs the Brussels bureaucracy solution.
As I am an ardent Europhile, as you may have read already (not passionate, mind you, just ardent:-), you know on what side I put myself... but the again I am also sensitive to the arguments put forward by Kagan and others, that the peaceful, negotiated situation we have in Europe is only possible because the US still works in the "Old" power-is-all frwmework and protects Europe from what would otherwise be irrelevance, inefficiency, invasion or worse. Although I believe that Europe is showing a better way to manage international relations, I don't have a convincing argument against Kagan's - except to say that the Europeans followed a way which was promoted and encouraged by Americans and that the two continents were working together, slowly, haphazardly, to bring such mechanisms to bear in relations with other countries, by the great mechanims of creating precedents. The current US administration is basically throwing down the drain 50 years of precedent and relative regard for international norms which they had largely contributed to shape. It's just such a waste.
The point I started with, "passion" vs. "reason", is the following: "Passion" is certainly more efficient to get to your political goal, but "reason" is more effective to make it last beyond the effect of your passion. Great rulers are those that built lasting institutions, not those that built great empires. Institutions last because there is minimum level of consent from those that live under them, and this usually requires a minimum of consistency in rules, adaptability to the needs of the population and restraint. (Which is why Napoleon is still well-regarded in France, despite his ruinous military campaigns - he left us a working civil code, and an efficient administrative network of prefects and public engineers)
Power does not tolerate restraint.
The US has no external limitation on its power (not completely true, I know, but it has an overwhelming domination, at least militarlily), but it has a lot of internal limits (you know, check and balances...). Let's see these get to work.
