Rouille

Bush urges EU membership for Turkey

Do you actually know what it entails?
Will you help, if it's so important to you?

The reason I posted about this was to ask if he (Bush) actually understands what it means to be part of the EU. Bringing Turkey in would be - to simplify only a little bit - the equivalent of bringing Mexico into the USA, giving them a cabinet seat, 10 senators, 40 congressmen, full rights to move, live and work in the US for all Mexican citizens and a few billion dollars a year to help Mexico build new airports, highways, etc... (and subsidise their farmers). Of course, it also means that Mexico has to adopt ALL existing US laws as they are as part of the deal.
That's what's happening in Europe this year with Eastern Europe coming in. They join us at the big table in Brussels (the European Commision - the supranational bureaucracy - and the Council of Ministers - the representatives from each country that have executive power) and in Strasbourg (the European Parliament) where between half and two thirds of all national laws are prepared (as European Directives).

So, to Bush - do not talk about things you do not understand.

As to the internal debate within Europe (or within each country) as to whether Turkey should join, it is indeed lively. I would like to venture that a very simple solution will be found in the coming years: with the UK most likely voting against the European Constitution, the countries that do want a political union (what the European Union has always really been about) will create a new core group, of which the UK, and possibly a few others, will not be. These "outs" will be linked to the core by full free trade and lots of other agreements and they will be joined by Turkey. They will cooperate with the core as they wish on various programs but will not be part of it. This way, Turkey can be part of "Europe" but not (yet?) of the political core.

Saw this Washington Post article about Siberian oil and the fight about where the next Russia pipe should go to (Japan or China).

The fact is that this is not exactly an oil conflict, but an oil transportation problem. Infrastructure forces trade patterns: if you have only one pipe to export, you can only sell to the clients at the end of the pipeline. Most oil is exported by sea, and thus the whole world is accessible to cargoes on water. The part of oil which is exported by pipe is very different. The difference between the "Chinese" pipeline and the "Japanese" pipeline is that the Chinese one goes ONLY TO CHINA, whereas the Japanese goes to the Pacific Ocean (and can thus also be used to deliver oil to China).
Transport politics are much more significant than oil politics, because (i) they create real, physical constraints on flow of goods (ii) for a very long time and (iii) it is the part of the industry which requires the largest investments. The natural gas industry is mostly an infrastructure business. Oil is like that for only a few (lanlocked) production zones, like Russia and the Caspian, which is why so much is said about these areas (including a lot of silly stuff).

I previously gave the example of Sterling based commodities only as an example of the durability of market standards, not as an especially significant one in strategic terms. EVERYBODY must agree on a replacement before switching to another currency; it's just not very easy to do.

I am sceptical of the claims that the US would go to war (in Irak) just to protect the status of the dollar as the hegemonic currency. The main advantage of having the dollar of the main international currency is that you can borrow internationally in your own currency, and thus you do not have to worry (like countries such as Argentina, Russia or, not so long ago, France) about international markets preventing you from running deficits (budgetary and trade) that could otherwise cause a devaluation of their assets. You can borrow more and cheaper, for a long time.
The euro has brought that same advantage to Europe without taking it from the US. It has also reduced the proportion of trade done by each country in a foreign currency, thus rending each individual country much less sensitive to exchange rates overall. This is again a plus for European countries which does not have consequences for the US. It has further created a new bond market in Euro, which as become as deep and sophisticated as the Us one. Europeans can now borrow cheaper and more as well, but again, no impact on the US.

Needing Dollars to buy oil simply means that the US, as the sole supplier, must be willing to provide dollars. They are more than willing, they are desperate to, as they import more than they export, and the dependency is actually a co-dependency. If they refused to provide dollars, now that would instantly force everybody to switch to another currency, as everybody needs to buy oil.
The current problem for the US is not that the Euro is undermining the dollar, it is that they have undermined the dollar for too long by becoming a net debtor to the rest of the world - the first empire to do so. Americans need to consume and consume, and they have been living above their means for a long time, on borrowed money. The past few years have seen an acceleration of these trends, with spending (ans imports) fueled by very low interest rates AND massive government spending. IT CANNOT LAST, and it has very little to do with the euro. The fact that the euro is available will actually help to keep the inevitable crisis a purely American one and not a worlwide one, as there will be a stable replacement currency available for everybody. Current US policies are doing all they can (even if unwittingly) to make the euro a realistic alternative.

So long as the US economy is the largest around and the heart of financial markets are in New York, Chicago and Boston, the markets will still be US-centric and only a massive loss of confidence in the US or in the dollar can change that. Bushco is doing just that (out of sheer incompetence, I am tempted to say), I don't know how you can state that this is a strategy to keep overall control...

I have seen democracy hijacked in a very small setting: my university class. You had two competing groups (to be elected as class bureau, i.e. class representatives, in charge of some student events and activities and spokesgroup for the class) making a campaign to be elected (by the class).

After a while, one group started saying that they were speaking for the silent majority and that they were really representing the whole class (except for that screaming minority - the other competing group).
The silent majority, being silent, did not deny this.
The other group tried to deny it, but it was called "partisan" and groundless by the other side. If they spoke calmly, they were ignored. If they spoke forcefull or screamed at the injustice, they were branded "extremists" or "isolated" and the domineering group would take advantage of the embarassment of the calmer members of the opposition.

The "majority" group was elected by a landslide, and the other group was thus doomed to isolation, a crazy band of embittered and wacko opponents. Once this was accepted as common wisdom by all, it was extremely hard a perception to destroy. Whatever the "minority" group would say afterwards (even if it made sense) would be seen throught the lenses - the interpretation - accepted by all that they were crazies not representing anyone.

Such behavior - the aggression on one side, the naiveté and then helplessness of the opposition, the passivity of the population (and their incomprehensible support for evil behavior - better understandable as staying in the "norm") are all visible in today's America. And such phenomena, in Billmon's very correct image of the snowball, are very hrad to reverse.

This experience is what makes me not worry too much about Kerry. He MUST NOT ALLOW himslef to get labelled anything noxious because that's deadly. He has managed that so far, which gives me some hope, still.

OT but very interesting.
This is an article which was published last week in Le Monde (the link may not last very long as the archives are paying).

I copy it here in full and translate the most interesting bits:

La compagnie française Total estime que le pic (ou maximum) de la production mondiale de pétrole interviendra dans la décennie 2020. Total estimate that Peak Oil will be reached between 2020 and 2030. Cette position est exprimée par Yves-Louis Darricarrère, directeur général de la branche Gaz-Electricité du groupe, dans le "Rapport sociétal et environnemental 2003", que Total vient de publier. "La fourchette oscille entre 2005-2010 pour les plus pessimistes, 2020-2030 pour les plus optimistes, écrit M. Darricarrère. Notre position, dans le groupe, privilégie l'hypothèse d'un pic à l'horizon 2020-2030."
C'est la première fois qu'une grande compagnie pétrolière prend une position aussi nette dans le débat qui agite depuis quelques années les milieux pétroliers sur la finitude des réserves d'or noir. Cette polémique a été relancée par des experts pétroliers indépendants américains et européens. Menés par le professeur Colin Campbell, ceux-ci estiment que le sommet de la production pétrolière mondiale interviendra rapidement, puisqu'on découvre moins de nouvelles réserves de pétrole qu'on en extrait chaque année. This is the first oil company ever to make such an explicit contribution to a debate which has been recently reawakened by European and US experts
"Nous avons le sentiment que le pic de la production pétrolière se rapproche", confirme au Monde M. Darricarrère. Le progrès technique a certes permis d'accroître les réserves pétrolières, d'une part en améliorant le taux de récupération de brut dans les gisements existants, d'autre part en permettant l'exploitation des grands fonds marins (à plus de 1 300 mètres), enfin en rendant rentable l'utilisation de bruts extra-lourds. "Mais il est de plus en plus difficile de renouveler les réserves, dit M. Darricarrère, et on a tendance à juger le pic de la production plus proche qu'on ne le faisait auparavant." Despite technical progress, which allows to get a bigger proportion of oil out of any fied than before, very deep offshore and very heavy crude, "it is becoming harder and harder to renew reserves and we tend, [within Total], to see Peak Oil coming earlier than we used to see it"
Il n'y a cependant pas péril en la demeure, puisqu'on évalue à quarante ans la durée des réserves prouvées par rapport au niveau de production actuel. Il y a une quinzaine d'années, l'estimation n'était que de trente ans de réserves. Total affiche cependant sa volonté de se diversifier dans le gaz et les énergies renouvelables. "Dans la production d'électricité, l'éolien pourrait être compétitif vers 2015, estime M. Darricarrère, ainsi que le solaire dans certaines régions bien ensoleillées." wind power should be fully competitive by 2015


BP REFUSE DE DONNER UNE DATE
La position de Total sur la proximité du pic pétrolier n'est pas ouvertement partagée par les autres grandes compagnies. Chez BP, qui publie vendredi 18 juin sa revue annuelle des statistiques de l'énergie - une référence dans la profession [found here]-, on se refuse à donner une date."Nous ne prévoyons aucun pic imminent de la production, indique Michael Smith, chef de l'unité d'analyse énergétique de BP. Il faut être très prudent dans les prévisions parce qu'on a vraiment une visibilité qu'à cinq ans." BP refuses to provide a date. "We see no peak in oil production in the near future"
M. Smith souligne l'augmentation constante de la production de pétrole ; de surcroît, contrairement aux affirmations des pessimistes,"les quantités de pétrole produites continuent à être remplacées". L'expert de BP note cependant que son rapport "n'a pas révisé physiquement les données nationales de réserves de pétrole et de gaz, et n'a pas essayé de les estimer à la place des pays concernés". Ce point est crucial : une partie du raisonnement des pessimistes repose sur l'argument que les statistiques des réserves sont souvent surévaluées par les Etats pour des raisons politiques.
Le débat ne pèse pas sur la soif mondiale d'or noir. Malgré un prix moyen en 2003 de 29 dollars le baril, le plus élevé depuis 1982, la consommation de pétrole a crû, selon BP, de 2,2 %, tirée par la croissance de la Chine. Mais selon M. Smith, celle-ci devrait se ralentir, ramenant l'augmentation de la consommation de pétrole au rythme d'environ 1,5 % par an.


Hervé Kempf

I have little sympathy for the Palestinians and I am still pro-Israeli, even today.

Israel, whatever its faults, is a democracy, and a lively one at that. It is torn (at least some parts of its society) by self-doubt. It has been wracked by the most abominable terrorist attacks on such a regular basis that it is almost not newsworthy anymore outside of the country to mention these crimes. Meanwhile Palestinians have been maintained in abject poverty (in refugee camps for 50 years, for God's sake!) by their hopelessly horrible leadership, with the support of most Arab nations, who are quite happy to keep this nasty sore in Israel's flank with little regard for the Palestinians' plight. They still will not accept Israel's right to existence, thus ensuring that it remains on a perpetual war footing.

Ok, now that I have you all pissed of and angry at me, here's the (ambivalent lawyerly) disclaimer: Sharon's policies make me despair, because they are basically the very policies that these Arab countries (who think that time is on their side) are hoping to see. Bullying, selfish and ultimately self-defeating (and yes, it is that last part that makes me the most depressed). Both sides need to get out of the win/lose mindset and go into a win/win mindset, otherwise, it will be a lose/lose as it is most of the time these days. But do note: if you blame Israel more in this situation, it is pure racism - the white man's syndrome. Israel should (MUST!) stop the colonies and the occupation, but the Palestinians CAN also do something, by abandoning suicide bombings. How can you build any society if your highest values are to kill enemy civilians by annihilating yourselves? BOTH sides are to blame, but if you only ask Israel to change (because they have the big military, and the big tanks, against kids with rocks, and the humiliating checkpoints, etc...), it means implicitly that you think that Palestinians should not be held to the same high standards that we (rightly) hold the Israelis. Think about it before lashing back at me.

and remember - Arafat, like Castro, Kadhafi and Chirac, was already in power in the late 60s.

In normal times, I would tend to say that "moderates" are more effective than "activists" to shape policy. But these are not normal times.

In normal times, political and policy debates take place in a peaceful context where you can expect the other side to listen to your arguments, either because you control some instruments of power, or simply because they are not unreasonable people. In that case, "moderates", "centrists", i.e. people willing to give up some of their goals in order to achieve others, seen as more important than those given up, can get results with similarly minded people on the other side. (- I want no more than 10. - I want no less than 30. - Okay, let's agree on 20.) Sometimes it's horse trading, some times it's powerplays, and sometimes it's even genuine bipartisanship. In that context, "activists", who focus on purity are not happy, but they can easily be marginalised. And policy, whoever is in power, is mostly centrist and reasonable, while leaning slightly more to the side of those that have the (temporary) upper hand in the power centres.

Now, if one side stops listening, and starts focusing only on its "pure" activists, what do you do? If you continue to negotiate in good faith with them, you are going to be steamrolled (- I want no more than 10. - I want no less than 100. - Okay, no more than 20. - 100. - Well, 30. - 100. - If you really insist, 40. - 100, etc...). If one side hardens like this, you usually hope that they will push things so far that there will be a backlash and things come back to normal as the extremists are voted out. But what if it does not happen? What if you have extraordinary circumstances that make that correcting mechanism ineffective?
You have to get out of the compromise mode and into battle mode. Not give in on anything; push your ideas, your agenda, your language relentlessly, until you get the other side to listen to you again, whether because you outshout them or because you manage to decredibilise them and they have to change their tune. That's the situation we're in today.

Now, I am of course simplifying things grossly. "Moderate" negotiators are never more effective than when they can say "take this deal, that's the best I will be able to get the crazies on my side to swallow; otherwise, they'll kick me out and you will have to deal with them!), so in effect activists help to improve things at all times for their side by influencing the negotiations, even if they are themselves unwilling to negotiate. Recognised activists/hardliners also have more legitimacy to impose compromises, and can thus make effective negotiators, if they accept to enter into such discussions with the other side.

Maybe my point is that there is a time to shape public opinion and common wisdom, and a time to negotiate the most advantageous deal within the framework permitted by such public opinion and perceptions. The right has spent a lot of the past decades to relentlessly shape opinion the way they want it, and thus forced the negotiators on their side to adopt positions close to theirs and compromise very little.
At this point, activists on the left are needed to change public opinion, and mobilise a large enough group (i) to influence and guide the discourse on the left while (ii) attracting enough support from the overall electorate. (i) requires strong activism, but (ii) requires that you do not alienate the constituencies that beieve in the CW. In particular, the most official face of the discourse (i.e. your candidate, Kerry today) must have a profile compatible with current CW, until you have managed to change that CW.
So my suggestion today is that activists act as partisanly as possible to change public opinion while accepting to support the only candidate under whom things have a chance to move in the good direction, evne though his discourse is wishy-washy. If you capture the public mood, the candidate will naturally adopt the corresponding policies, even if he has not said he would. If you don't, he will stay in the middle, which is quite far to the right these days, at least according to CW. Don't undermine him, in any case. (And I would also suggest, do not underestimate him. Kerry is currently doing the right things to not lose the election. Activists will help to shape the policy debates, but only after someone from their side is in place. Today, it means Kerry)

I have had 3 articles published in the WSJ - and even worse, in the editorial pages! (3 strikes, you're out?). On the other hand, I'm very proud to be discussed on dKos!!

My 3 articles (just Google my name) were about Russia and the very interesting thing is that Russian "capitalism" is so bizarre that they would not be out of place here either.

Anyway, I have nothing to hide. I do work with BigOil, and I actually have quite a bit of respect for the guys (very few gals) in these companies that do the dirty work in totally fucked countries so that we can drive our cars while only bitching about how supposedly expensive gasoline is...

To people that complain about the importance of oil in politics, I say: please come up with an alternative. Do not just argue against oil, against nuclear, against dams, even against ugly windmills. Argue FOR something else (and "energy savings" is not good enough. How do you encourage them?)

remember:
- "the stone age did not end for lack of stone" (SA Minister for oil)
- "if we do not take steps to massively increase the price of oil (through taxes), nature will do it for us much more brutally, eventually (although probably not during our lifetimes)" (me)

Some comments on this Swedish study which purports to explain why the USA have a larger GDP per capita than European countries.

GDP comparisons are notoriously unreliable. Heck, you get different numbers from Eurostat, OECD, IMF, i.e. the official international institutions that supposedly use the same data provided by each government... The only thing that you can conclude is that most European countries are close enough that it is impossible to tell effectively any statistical difference. You have a few poorer countries (Greece, Portugal and of course the new members) and a few richer (Luxembourg and Switzerland) ones. The USA are, like these last two, somewhat richer than the average Western Europeans, according to most GDP measures.

- then you have questions of what the GDP measures, and how. Different countries have different methodologies and it is basically impossible to reconcile them. Just to give you an exemple, the US uses "hedonistic" pricing, whereby a computer which is 10 times more powerful than a model from 5-year ago but costs the same in dollars counts more towards GDP than the other model did, because it is more powerful. You do mostly the same stuff with it (and Microsoft Windows and Word are 10 times more heavy, but do the same thing), but it is "worth" more. Software is counted as an "investment" in the US but as an "expense" in most European countries, which impacts GDP differently again. The US uses more energy per capita than in Europe. This is counted as a positive factor (for the USA) towards GDP. Is that good? Services are included at cost, because it is hard to measure them in any other way. Does that undervalue US GDP, where services contribute more? etc...

- then you compare growth rates. How do you choose the dates for comparisons? the same date for all, or a more consistent bottom-or-the-recession to top-of-the-boom? Depending on your choices, you can get very different results. Most comparisons these days use 1990 as a baseline, which was pretty close to the end of the US recession, whereas the European one took place in 1993. So any comparison of the 90s includes no US recession but the European one. If you start doing 1993-2002, it suddenly looks less favorable.

- then you have to decide whether you accept the value of GDP (or the number of cars, washing machines, etc) as an indicator of wealth and quality of life. Should you use instead other indicators, whether economic or social? (Tax rates, rate of overall employment, rate of unemployment - bad for "Old Europe", proportion of poor, illiteracy rates, infant deaths - bad for the US). Do you adjust for immigration-related issues (they're usually poorer, less well educated, but work and will contribute in other ways, including to population growth)? And how do you measure quality in all this??

So the conclusion is - Americans probably work more and have more stuff. Europeans work a bit less and have a bit less. The work done is split differently on the two continents (the young, the old and of course the unemployed work much less in Europe). Is the fact that Europeans work less linked to incentives (higher taxes, less revenue for your work, general bureaucratic obstacles to entrepreneurship,...) or a matter of choice (because they "enjoy life")? It's very hard to tell, but it is easy to find numbers that "prove" either hypothesis.

Personally, I tend to favor higher taxes when you can see the results. I am reasonably happy with the quality of the streets and railways in France, with our health care system and education system. Are things perfect? Of course not. Is it better than what you have in the US? I'd say it's a matter of individual preferences. As a banker, I'd probably do well in the US, get good health coverage, live in a nice neighborood with a good school, etc... and pay less taxes, but wouldn't that be a bit selfish of me to think that way?

"la liberté de la presse ne s'use que lorsque l'on ne s'en sert pas"
The freedom of the press is lost only when it is not used
(Motto of the Canard enchaîné, an independent French weekly)

Freedom needs to be protected and fought for. It is an unending fight against violence and the selfish grab for power by others.
Democracy is having institutions - rules - that are accepted by all and allow conflicts and disagreements to be solved in ways less harmeful to all. Normal debate in a democracy is about who is favored in such conflicts. Today, the debate is about the existence of the rules themselves, whether they aply to all or not - in essence, it is about whether the US wants democracy or not.

Many instruments of democracy still function, and as -pea- said, blogs are the newest instrument, but ultimately, the arbiters of the game are to be found within the legislative branch (holding the executive to account) and the judiciary (upholding the rules - and their existence). One early test will be the Supreme Court decision on the Padilla case. A decision favorable to the administration would be ominous, to say the least.

Let's not give up yet.

Nice graph

Every once in a while, you have a paradigm-changing international crisis, where you decisions are going to influence the behavior and decisions of all others for a long time. This usually comes at the end of a war, when the victors decide how to treat the vainquished. It can also happen following a change of leadership in a country, or a big natural catastrophe. Such a situation creates a void and the opportunity to create really new precedents and models of behavior.


Thus WWI led to the botched attempt to create the League of Nations, the blind egoism of the victors, the reparations wrought from Germany leading to this country's resentment and the eventual rise of Nazism.

In contrast, WWII was followed by the Nuremberg trials, the Bretton Woods institutions, the Marshall Plan. It gave the lasting image of a magnanimous victor, willing to put some limits to its power for the greater good of all (and eventually of itself) through multilateral institutions it did not necessarily control in theory, and to help the losers to rebuild.

The first Gulf war, while clearly motivated by oil, was only waged after the US created a grand coalition to do so and built strong international legitimacy. Thus, absent the Soviet Union, the US, despite its obvious strength, decided to abide by the rules of international agreements to defend its interests in the region, and did not go beyond that mandate (to kick Saddam out of Kuweit).

9/11 was another such event. After that attack, the US basically had an open mandate to change the rules of international behavior. The world was ready to support, or at least tolerate, far reaching changes; money laundering, arms trafficking, a determined fight against WMD proliferation... In a word, many countries would have been forced to accept intrusive rules/inspections, provided that it applied to all. (This may sound optimistic, but for a few weeks in 2001, everybody was terrified of the reaction of the "awakened giant" and would have gone to many lengths to avoid its wrath - and there was plenty of blame to go around.)
Well, what did Bush do? Bomb a country back to the stone age and abandon it there. Attack and bomb another country just because there was unrelated unfinished business with it. Curtail civil rights. Push torture as a quasi official instrument of policy. In short, be petty, vindicative and heavy-handed.

International law has lost whatever little credibility it had, and the message that "might is right" was heard loud and clear by all, especially those that harbor realistic ambitions to be "mighty" in the future, globally or regionally.
The message that "anything goes" was also welcomed by the same, who have always found the West bothersome and intrusive with its "human rights" - now they won't even have to pay lip service to that.
That message was also heard quite loudly domestically by the "patriots", for whom anyone with a different opinion is a "traitor". Torture and stifling of the freedom of expression are natural consequences of this.

Bush has an opportunity to use this dramatic attack to change the rules for the better. Instead, he has brought back the international community 100 years back or more. He has betrayed the values of the USA (and of the West) so thoroughly that we are to pay the consequences for many decades.

Humans usually are:

(1) lazy - they won't make an effort unless they feel it's REALLY necessary
(2) selfish - if they can take something instead of making an effort to have it, they will
(3) cowardly - they will blame others for their problems.

That's a recipe for life to be "nasty, brutish and short", as Hobbes put it, and indeed, for the most part of our history, it was.
Luckily, or miraculously, someone lazier, more selfish, more cowardly and also less short-sighted noticed that things could be simpler if people did things in group rather than alone. Easier to hunt the mammouth, easier to sleep and rest if one amongst the "tribe" guards the area, easier to be clothed and fed and housed if the tasks are distributed around. Thus came specialisation and trade, which are a great way for lazy, selfish people to do less and yet live as well or better.
The problem with trade and human relations is that you need TRUST to conduct it. How do you build that when you are also cowardly? Initially, you would trust only the people around you: your family, your tribe, your kinsmen, etc... because simply you can check if trust is warranted through guaranteed repeated interaction. This is still the core source of trust in many civilisations nowadays. The other way to build trust - when it is required between people that may not have interacted before and may not interact later - was to have an entity enforce it: guilds, hierarchies, and finally, a power above everybody else, the State. Initially closer to Hobbes' Leviathan (treating all equally bad, through absolute rule), it started to provide the basic functions (that Pat mentioned above) of a "libertarian" state: police, military, rough justice, some minimal infrastructure building. In modern terms, it's also called feudalism.
Now, feudalism was clearly a progress locally, but it did not prevent wars and mayhem at the above level: fights between feudal lords. Thus started a new process of aggregation, whereby a central entity was created to solve the problem of the lazyness, selfishness and cowardice of the feudal lords. Thus the modern State was created. It is twice removed from direct interaction between people, it thus needs intermediaries, i.e. a bureaucracy, to intervene; and it has a ever growing tendency to meddle in more and more things.

States come in many different forms. Again, the basic question is: what do you TRUST it to do?

1) to protect you from the random aggression of others.

Most states manage that, except quite often when the "others" are wealthy and/or close to the power (see 3 below).

2) to protect you from the aggression of itself (i.e. of its bureaucracy, in any form, including military or police forces, or anyone that has access to them, weather the wealthy, the aristocrats or any other similarly powerful class or group).

Democratic states, but no one else, usually manage that imperfectly.

3) to protect you from interference by others in any productive work you may do.

Not all democratic states do that; some non-democratic may do it somewhat.

2) to protect you from interference by itself (again, its various bureaucracies and the groups/individuals that have access to them) in any productive work you may do;

few do.

(the definition of "interference" is voluntarily kept fuzzy here. The opinions on what is a reasonable level of State intervention (taxes, regulation, etc) can vary significantly...)

Remember in any case that people within the State administrative apparatus ALSO are lazy, selfish and cowardly and they WILL take advantage of the (portion of the) power captured by the State that they wield unless otherwise restrained (i) internally (morality, ethics, cultural or religious rules) or (ii) externally (clear rules of conduct, enforced. You bump quickly into the perennial question "quid custodiet ipsos custodiet" - Who guards the guardians? Who enforces rules on the enforcers?

If people were good, moral, responsible, you would not need to ask this question, and any system of state organisation would work. Communism would be great (each to work in accordance with his/her capacities, each to have in accordance with his/her needs). A benevolent dictator would be fine as well. And pigs would fly.

People are not always these things - in any case, you cannot TRUST them to be so consistently. So how can TRUST be the founding block of civilisation?
The answer is simple: make someone else's laziness, selfishness or cowardice force people to behave - and vice-versa. Thus, division of powers, checks and balances, accountability. Bureaucracies with divergent interests, divergent support groups in the population, different "friends" fighting it out.

It is a miracle that these (institutions whereby bureaucracies are kept in check) ever appeared. When they are in place, they can be self-perpetuating (big test of this underway this year in the US...). If they are not there yet and you have the power to put them in place, it goes against your immediate interests to do so, because precisely it restrains the power you have. So this a tribute to people like the philosophers of the Lumières and the creators of the US Constitution that they were far-sighted enough to see that this would be a good thing for everybody in the long run: everybody's tendency to laziness, selfishness and cowardice is still there, has been fed (we work much less, we have more things than ever, we are safer than ever from most threats (again, speaking in general terms, not specifically about this year...), and we are officially encouraged to blame others, especially politicians for anything that is wrong) but has been put to good use.

TRUST is fed by institutions that do NOT expect people to be trustworthy: institutions that check your promises, punish your breaches, and allow others to do the same and enforce the results. Institutions that help you check other institutions, whereby no institution is without constriant. At the individual level, it is then much easier to trust people when you know that you have recourse if they do not deliver. It is much harder to cheat, lie, abuse, etc.. if you know that someone will catch up with you.

This system is NOT the rule of money, it is the rule of law. The most effective form of capitalism is not a system that loves money, it is a system that loves rules and procedures. If you want fairness and chances for the poor, for the masses, do not look after money, look after rules.

That's what the Democratic party should be: the party of RULES - against the rule of money and the ongoing abuse of money that corrupts existing rules. Focus on procedures: enforcement first , on control/oversight of the enforcement second, and then discuss the actual content of the rules. Well-enforced rules breed morality - which is essentially the internalisation of these rules (plus basic decency). Morality generates trust - trust in the individual enhanced by trust in the institutions. Trust allows individuals to focus on their life and be free and do great things, although they are -still - at heart lazy, selfish and cowardly.


Communism is bureaucratic power unchecked. It grinds the individual. Communists are lazy, selfish and cowardly and get away with it.
Libertarianism is individual power gone unchecked. It grinds the weak. Libertarians are lazy, selfish and cowardly and get away with it.
Democracy is NO power goes unchecked. It should grind anything that grows too powerful. People are still lazy, selfish and cowardly, but they cannot get away with it.

Natural gas is essentially a transport business. See here a previous post of mine on the economics of the sector. As such, the markets of North America, Europe and Asia are mostly separate (although LNG is now opening new possibilities for arbitrage).

- in the US, natural gas prices are mostly linked to electricity prices as it is used first and foremost for electricity generation. But electricity prices are still in good part determined by the economics of coal plants (50% of capacity in the US). With electricity demand growing, and North American production of NG not keeping up gas prices are indeed growing, but the ways for the markets to balance are many: build plants using coal, or wind (which is becoming really competitive at today's prices), reduced gas consumption by industries that have substitutes for NG, imort morde (hence all the LNG import terminal projects these days). Prices will stay high, but the markets will clear.

- in Europe and Asia, natural gas prices are still mostly indexed to oil prices, so they are pretty high these days, but passed on through to customers. Electricity prices thus follow and are also rising.

World wide, natural gas is a lot more plentiful than oil and will be produced as needed. The politics are different as the main reserves are in Russia (which is the first producer) and Iran (which produces almost nothing), but the main other producers are the US, Canada, Norway, UK, Holland, Indonesia, Algeria, Qatar. It is a VERY capital-intensive industry and fully in control of the Western companies. the locals CANNOT build this industry without Westenr know-how and finance. It is currently quite profitable and a focus of development for all big oil majors.
(And it is also much cleaner as a fuel than coal or petrol)

I need to learn to make my posts shorter, but you may still be interested to learn that the new big thing for the industry is GTL (gas to liquids) which is a process which allows to make high-quality gasoline from natural gas. It used to be seen as too costly (it costs 18-25$/boe (barrel of oil equivalent), which used to be too much for comfort) but the first large scale project has been launched in Qatar recently.

You have many sources of energy that are competitive at higher oil prices:

- GTL (see this post) from 25$/b
- oil sands (Canada, Venezuela) from 30$/b (and it does not matter it it looks impossible to transport as it is: that price above includes the cost of the process to make it into something transportable and/or equivalent to oil AND the self-consumtion of energy to do that.
- stranded fields (fields that are currently too far away from transport routes or existing pipeline networks to be worth investing in at lowish prices)
- additional recovery from existing fields, though reservoir management, horizontal drilling, water injection (it does not matter if you get 90% water out, the 10% oil is still worth something at the right price)
- large scale wind will be competitive on a stand alone basis with 40-50$/b oil
- and then, we always have nuclear; maybe people will care less about waste storage if that's the only way to get cheap electricity.

So, actually, I am not sure that prices will rise high enough to force behavior changes. Remember, with 6$/gallon gasoline, we still drive our cars without any serious limitation in Europe.

May I further add that ALL freeways in France are paying, and cost approx. 8-10c/km, i.e. 15c/mile, i.e. 3$/gallon on top of your gasoline costs (for a 20 MPG car - even more if you have a fuel efficient car!))

GASOLINE IS TOO DAMN CHEAP FOR OUR OWN GOOD.

The only way to change behavior is to increase gas prices.
There are two ways to do that:
- gas taxes
- a nice big oil crisis.

It seems that Bushco, as always, chose the politically convenient route :))

If prices go up, some uses of oil with be abandoned. Some people may walk, or take a train, because they can and it has become cheaper. Some will go for a more efficient car. some will switch to working from home. Some will start heating their house less. Some industries will switch to coal or natural gas if they can. Etc, etc...

On the supply side, some reservoirs will become economically viable at higher prices; oil sands (a lot of them in Canada) will also become viable although they are less efficient than oil - the higher price will make that low efficiency good enough at that price. Alternative energies, especially wind power, will become fully competitive and will provide additional supply.

Altogether, this means that we should reach a new equilibrium at a higher oil price. The transition could be messy, especially as the fact that spare capacity being low, as Kevin pointed out, means that prices will be much more volatile (jumping to 100$/b or more before coming back to 60, for instance). But people will adapt EASILY to 5 ot even 10$ gas. Such large scale increases took place in the 70s, and were compounded at the same time in Europe by strong tax hikes. Prices levels in Europe were today's equivalent of 15$/gallon in 1980, so 5-6$/gallon feels cheap nowadays (and people have indeed stopped worrying about mileage in Europe in the last 15 years). There was a recession, but nothing civilisation-destroying. So if prices go up people will adapt - AND THERE ARE ENOUGH ALTERNATIVES TO OIL THAT WE WE ALL HAVE THE TIME TO ADAPT to a less oil-intensive world.

I am French and I have to tell you that the market actually works? Including for an eventually finite resource like oil?

Back in 1964, the 20th anniversary of D-Day, Walter Cronkite interviewed President Eisenhower who was previously the Supreme Allied Commander for that operation. And he interviewed him at a cemetery near Omaha Beach. President Eisenhower said, quote, "Mamie and I get our greatest pleasure from our grandchildren. When I look at all these graves, I think of the parents back in the States whose only son is buried here. Because of their sacrifice, they don't have the pleasure of grandchildren.

And because of their sacrifice, my grandchildren are growing up in freedom." Today our servicemen and women, some of whom are the grandchildren of World War II veterans, bravely and selflessly defend that same freedom. They understand very well the importance of that duty, especially at this critical time in our nation's history. I welcome all of you to this hallowed ground today as we remember all those who sacrificed so that our grandchildren grow up in freedom.

“. . . these men came here - British and our allies, and Americans - to storm these beaches for one purpose only, not to gain anything for ourselves, not to fulfill any ambitions that America had for conquest, but just to preserve freedom. . . . Many thousands of men have died for such ideals as these. . . but these young boys. . . were cut off in their prime. . . I devoutly hope that we will never again have to see such scenes as these. I think and hope, and pray, that humanity will have learned. . . we must find some way . . . to gain an eternal peace for this world.”


Comments that follow from "Route 66":

I have a sick feeling in my stomach right now, a feeling that we have lost all that we have stood for, all that we have learned since schoolchildren about the ideals of this country...

A sitting President has an obligation to be a leader, not to consult outside legal consul to help save his imperial ass.

A sitting President has an obligation to the people, not to craven special interests and cronies.

A sitting President has the responsibility to utilize our servicemen and women in defense of ideals and promotion of democracy, not in the promotion of ideas and schemes to enrich private corporations and their major shareholders.

A sitting President of the United States is someone to be respected by the world, not to be a laughing stock and symbol of abuse of power and corruption on high.

Mr. Bush, we want our country back and we are going to take it back from you, and from Mr. Cheney, Ms. Rice, Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Powell, Mr. Feith, Mr. Wolfowitz, etc.

Before we attribute super-human qualities to the Iranian spooks or leadership, I'd like to give a slightly less positive view of that country on two subjects:

- oil & gas industry.
They have competent people in the oil business, but it still looks like they are living off the investments made under the Shah period (with Western involvement) and have trouble developing new stuff on their own. The "Buy-Backs" which I mentioned briefly above are a way for them to get Western companies to do things they cannot, i.e. offshore production or rehabilitation of ageing fields. It's been a slow, painful process, very frustrating for all sides. Banks were pretty much willing to throw money at their projects but they could not make up their minds and nothing happened.
Worse, on the natural gas side, they have TWICE in the past 25 years lost the opportunity to corner the market. They have the second largest reserves after Russia, and they are sitting there untapped because the Iranians could not take the opportunity to take them to the market.
*The first time was in the late 70s/early 80s when Eruope needed a big gas pipe for new supplies. Iran (through Turkey) was the logical source, but it did not happen, the Soviets rushed in and they now have a deathgrip on the European market which will NEVER be lost now.
*The second time is on the LNG front. You may have heard that this is hot stuff now, with the US considering many import terminals in order to buy more of the stuff. Iran would like to do LNG, but they do not have the technology and must rely on foreign partners. They have spent so much time playing Western (European) companies off each other that nothing has happened, no project, nada. At the same time, Qatar, whose gas reserves consist essentially of their part of a super giant field, which is right in the middle of the Persian Gulf and is shared with Iran (which basically means that in the absence of a joint development, whoever pumps the gas first gets it, it's physically a single bubble) is busily attracting Western investmetn to become the largest exporter on LNG in the world and cashing in massively on that.
This is big stuff. Russian pipe exports to Europe account for 25% (and growing) of the market, 10% of Russian GDP, 25% of budget income - and they basically kept the country alive in the 90s. This has real geopolitical significance. Qatar is already getting several billion dollars of income from existing trains ansd billions more currently in new investment. Another self-sustaining "aircraft carrier" in the region...

- general attitude
now I admit this is just a personal impression from a few short visits, but I got the distinct impression that the Iranians feel very superior to us (the West) and this it is only out of luck that we are richer and more influential in the world than they are. Maybe this is a symmetrical blindness on my part, but this is an attitude that I have seen in many other countries with a great past and a fucked up system and economy. They resent our wealth and overreaching presence but will not make the link with our system and values, especially freedom, including for women (Iran is actually one of the best places for women in the region). (and yes, to rememberinggiap, I do think that the West is a MUCH better system that the others, especially all forms of communism or statism, because, however imperfect we are, there are self-correcting mechanisms. We'll see in the very near future if it still works...And please do not start me on all the death of these communists or statist regimes, of which Iran is one).
So let's not idealise Iranian policies in the region. Let's first focus on incompetence in Washington; some opportunism on the part of the other ME powers, as stated in your first post, is very plausible.

This very long post is the addition of 4 successive comments posted by Valdron on Billmon's website today. I found them extremely interesting and have shamelessly decided to post them in full. They are further commented and discussed on this thread, where they were initially posted.

Valdron@cncom.net


First, let me offer a few thoughts. All this 'ant-semitism' stuff is really a red herring and we shouldn't pay attention to it. It's merely throwing mud into an issue that is complex enough.

Allow me to offer a hypothesis. There were four significant regional powers in the middle east. The United States was manipulated into a war upon the fourth power, Iraq, by the other three, each of whom had a motive for wanting to see that regime overthrown.
The big surprise that we're seeing with Chalabi is that the third power, the Iranians, may have had leverage to control and manipulate the United States. There is no question that they were strongly motivated to see Saddam gone, given the fact that he'd had a decade long and very nasty war with them. They were also strongly motivated to see Saddam gone by the reasonable prospects of being very influential in any Shiite dominated Iraq.

But there are two other middle eastern powers which were in play.

Israel is one of them. Look, set aside anti-semitism, this is a no brainer. Israel regarded Iraq as a major security threat, no if's and's or but's. The degree of this security threat on an ongoing basis can be seen in Israel's assassination of Iraqi scientists, their raid on Iraqi nuclear facilities, and their ongoing concerns about wmd's. Saddam Hussein was one of the loudest Palestinian advocates in the region, he'd lobbed SCUD's into Israel during the Gulf War. Let's just admit they didn't like him and wanted him gone. Anti-semitism or conspiracy theory simply doesn't enter into it.

Did Israel have levers, directly or indirectly, to manipulate the American government? You bet your sweet patooty they did. There is a huge and very aggressive pro-Israel lobby in the United States. Nothing wrong with that. They're very successful, very good at what they do, and their objective is biasing or aligning American foreign policy to support Israel's interests. There is perhaps a more questionable channel of influence, which is within the Neocon movement themselves, some or many of whom appear to merge Israel and American foreign policy goals, for whatever reason.

Turning to the third leg of the axis, it also seems very clear from Woodward's latest book that the Saudi Arabian government was highly motivated to get rid of Saddam Hussein and was heavily involved in supporting or encouraging the decision. Clearly, according to Woodward, the Saudi's were in it up to the elbows, and exercising their own levers of power.
So what does this amount to? A 'perfect storm' of competing regional powers, three of whom had separate levers of influence with the Americans, three of whom for separate reasons all had coinciding interests in getting rid of the fourth.
The picture that emerges is not of the United States undertaking clear foreign policies, but of a hapless dupe, manipulated and bamboozled into undertaking a reckless and foolish action without any appreciation of the consequences.
And in fact, its pretty clear that there wasn't any credible appreciation of the consequences, or even of what the hell to do with the occupation.

But consequences follow acts like night follows day. If, in whole or in part, the American invasion was really the product of a 'perfect storm' of consensus and influence by the remaining regional powers, then where does that leave the Americans when the perfect storm is over?

And arguably, it may be over. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel may each have radically different goals and foreign policy objectives which may or may not mesh.

Israel essentially wants a politically quiescent Iraq, possibly broken up into smaller states or federalized into impotence, which poses no military or security threat, provides diplomatic recognition, supports its Palestinian process, and provides both guaranteed oil and water supplies and a trading relationship as a sort of Israeli economic hinterland society.

Iran essentially wants a Shiite dominated unitary state, hopefully theocratic, in which it is the major influential player. Iran, I suspect, has plans for an Iran/Iraq Axis which would dominate the middle east much like the Franco/German Axis dominates Europe. Iran's plans for Iraq are almost completely incompatible with those of Israel.
Saudi Arabia's plans and objectives are almost completely inscrutable. It appears that their major middle east foreign policy objective is to merely stay two jumps ahead of everyone else. They're likely to oppose Iranian influence or an Iran/Iraq Axis that would leave them as an 'also ran' in the middle east, much like Britain in Europe.
They're also strongly inclined to oppose any kind of Shiite aspirations, including regional autonomy, partition or federalization of Iraq which would foment Shiite unrest within their own borders or in other Persian Gulf states.

So they're probably opposing Israel on that front.
They're also unlikely to wish to acquiesce to Israeli economic domination in Iraq, nor to endorse Israel's security or Palestinian process, since it would ultimately erode their own position.
The best option for them might be an extension of monarchic or feudal rule in a Sunni dominated Iraq. Failing that, another secular police state which is prepared to accept status as a Saudi client or ally.

In short, the goals and objectives of the Israeli's, Saudi's and Iranians in Iraq seem completely incompatible. So where does this put the American occupation?

Between Iraq and a hard place, I think. (sorry, I couldn't resist). It may become increasingly difficult for the United States to sustain an occupation against the opposition of one or more of the regional powers. Simply put, each of the regional powers is more than capable of arming, supplying and providing shelter and support to proxies or natural allies within Iraq. Israel to the Kurds, Iran to the Shiites, Saudi Arabia to the Sunni tribes.

That sets the stage for a continuing and increasing level of violence against the occupation, and against any American proxy that would be very problematic. It may also result in a fairly nasty civil war driven by outside powers.
The natural American response might be to ally with one or two of the regional/internal factions. But that only earns the enmity of the other. It's hard to see a good outcome.

Allying with Israel and the Kurds basically would amount to giving the rest of the country away and setting the ground for a Saudi/Iranian regional alliance that might well be disastrous for American ambitions in the region. Given the geopolitical situation in the region, a Kurdish/American alliance seems likely to produce the fewest dividends and the worst outcomes from a long range point of view.

An American/Iranian alliance seems completely unlikely. It's simply not in the cards.

An alliance with the Saudi's and Sunni's may be viable, but it brings its own problems, and the result would inevitably be the Kurds and Shiites, backed by Iran, against the U.S.
In any case, Saudi goals and American goals may not be compatible.

The best solution for the Americans would be maintaining the support of the Saudi's and Israel, ensuring that the Shia are quiescent and Iran is excluded, and buying off the Sunni and Kurds. So far, with the exception of Israeli support externally, and Kurdish support internally, none of these things seem to be happening.

It's a mess.

Basically, the notion of the United States being manipulated by a 'perfect storm' does a lot to explain America's imperial behaviour over the last couple of years, and also explains the apparent helplessness we've been seeing here now. The Imperial ambitions that lead us into this mess seem increasingly naive and unrealistic.

People, we may have been played.

Posted by: Valdron at June 2, 2004 11:15 AM


According to American officials, the Iranian official in Baghdad, possibly not believing Mr. Chalabi's account, sent a cable to Tehran detailing his conversation with Mr. Chalabi, using the broken code. That encrypted cable, intercepted and read by the United States, tipped off American officials to the fact that Mr. Chalabi had betrayed the code-breaking operation, the American officials said. American officials reported that in the cable to Tehran, the Iranian official recounted how Mr. Chalabi had said that one of "them" — a reference to an American — had revealed the code-breaking operation, the officials said. The Iranian reported that Mr. Chalabi said the American was drunk.

Let me throw something else out here. The Persians seem to have been very good at manipulating American politics.

Back in 1980, they used the hostage crisis to get rid of Jimmy Carter, and they haven't been shy about taking credit for that either.
Then in the 1980's, the used Iran/Contra to essentially discredit and paralyze the American Reagan administration. Make no mistake about it, Casey died, McFarlane tried to kill himself, half of Reagan's foreign policy team was up on charges, and American's influence in Iraq and in the region took a major wedgie.
If we accept that Chalabi was acting as an Iranian double agent, passing information to them, and passing misinformation to further Iranian political goals to us... and this seems very possible...

Then take the next step...

What if the Iranians decided to deliberately burn Chalabi?

To what end, you ask?

Very simple. Destroy Chalabi, and you take out the American's annointed political pawn in Iraq, and you keep your double agent from ever being in a position of power where he could have been independent. The Americans basically have to scramble to try and come up with a new 'heir apparent' if they can manage it. Their occupation plans are thrown into chaos.

But more than that, you set off a political cluster bomb in the United States. Chalabi as a double agent, Iranian spy? The whole invasion was based on a pack of lies? That completely discredits the invasion, which discredits the occupation, which makes the American occupation increasingly politically untenable. Hell, it may well make the occupation impossible and unacceptable to domestic Americans, particularly if there is a body count.

But there's more. It goes quite a ways towards discrediting the political forces that supported the invasion and occupation - the Neocons and the Warhawks of the Bush administration. Suddenly, they're tainted by association with Chalabi, which renders them suspect, credulous, and impotent.
But there's more. The Iranians made an explicit point of saying one of "them" — a reference to an American — had revealed the code-breaking operation, the officials said. The Iranian reported that Mr. Chalabi said the American was drunk.

My my my. Twisting the knife around, are we? Suddenly, it's not just association with Mr. Chalabi's lies that's the problem. Suddenly, it is now part of the record that someone associated with Chalabi was a drunk, an incompetent, and a traitor. Someone high up with access to very confidential material...
In short, it's a political cluster bomb designed to discredit and paralyze the Bush administration, or a large part of it. With any luck, they may figure they'll be able to get rid of Bush the way they destroyed Carter. Even if they don't get that, they've got an almost certain guarantee of kicking off Iran/Contra II.

In short, the Iranians may not have screwed up or made a mistake by sending the cable that blew Chalabi through a channel that they'd been told was compromised.
They may well have done it deliberately, because they were predicting the political fallout and firestorms that would hit the U.S. because of it.
The hell of it is, now that I think of it, that they didn't even actually need Chalabi to do it. He might even be innocent. All they needed was to know their security had been compromised, and after that, all they needed was a plan and a reasonably good story that the Americans would swallow.
Hmmm... Aren't the Persians the oldest empire on Earth? Fought the Greeks, the Romans, the Mongols, the Caliphate, the Ottomans, the British, the Russians and they're still standing. Didn't they invent Chess? Perhaps we are outclassed.

Posted by: Valdron at June 2, 2004 11:37 AM


Jerome,

Actually, the Americans used the Iranians as a proxy for their interests in the Persian Gulf throughout the 60's and 70's, and in the 80's the Iran/Contra affair was an attempt to see if Iran could be re-enlisted. So it's not out of the question.

An American/Iranian alliance is a possibility, and it would have the advantage of fairly decisively settling the situation in Iraq. Against an American/Iranian/Shiite axis, I don't think that the Saudi's would have any leverage in Iraq, nor would the Kurds or the Sunni's be able to put up much of a fight.

So yes, there may be a short term advantage there for the United States, and there are signs that the Iranians are opening the door for precisely that kind of cooperation... largely because it will allow them the sort of government they would be happy to deal with in Iraq.

On the other hand, American foreign policy for the last 25 years has largely been focused on the containment of the Iranians. So what happens when you let that genie out of the bottle?

An Iranian/Iraqi axis might well be strong enough to push the United States out of the region entirely. Such an Iranian/Iraq axis could easily extend to Syria and Lebanon, completely altering the military and political balances of the region.

There is a substantial Shiite majority in the oil producing regions of Saudi Arabia... that's a cause for concern. At least one of the Persian Gulf states, Quatar or Bahrain, I think, is Shiite dominated. Large Shiite populations are also to be found in Lebanon, other Persian gulf states and possibly the former Soviets. How does that shake out? I'm not sure, but there may be huge scope here for the Iranians to extend their political and military influence.

On the eastern border there would be scope for Iran to build bridges to American ally Pakistan, an Islamic nuclear power. A strong Iranian/Pakistani alliance might well find that the United States is less important.

In short, there's reason to believe that the Iranians could benefit immensely from an alliance of convenience with the United States. Their interests and ambitions could be enhanced at literally every point.

In the long run, however, it strikes me that such an alliance could be potentially disastrous to the American's long term goals and objectives, or to their strategic interests in the region. The risk is to see the formation of a new Persian empire or Federation dominating the middle east, and rubbing up against Russia, Europe and India.

I'm not sure that the United States is truly capable of this level of stupidity and incompetence. The situation would be like that of Napolean III of France, who blundered and bungled his way into the unifications of Germany and Italy, which ended France's role as the continental superpower.

Posted by: Valdron at June 2, 2004 12:02 PM


Actually no, I didn't forget the Turks. I just didn't think anything of them.

The Turks have been pushed out of the middle east since the 1920's, they have no significant credibility or credentials there. They've been out of step with the region politically, religiously and economically.

In Geostrategic terms, the Turks are literally blocked off by Iran and Iraq. They've got no access to the middle east, except through these countries, and each of these countries is a rival power. So this limits their influence and opportunities.

They've got some limited potential for access through Syria as a relatively weak state. But they've never been able to successfully make a move there. Syria has always been tightly embedded in the Arab political framework, and has instead looked everywhere else - to Egypt, Iraq, Iran, the USSR for allies. Syria has also had a longstanding historical grievance with Turkey relating to a post WWI territorial adjustment... France gave away Syrian territory to Turkey, the Syrians have never been happy about it.


That may change, there have been recent diplomatic initiatives between Syria and Turkey which suggest a thaw. But its frankly too early to tell where this will go, or if it will amount to anything. My own thinking is that its one of those 'placeholder' initiatives, it keeps the balls in the air but can be supplanted by other alliances.

Turkey may have opportunities to make inroads into the Muslim Turkish former Soviet states on its northeastern border. For some seventy years, it was stalled out and stymied there, but there's the possibility that things may have opened up. I've no idea if the Turks are pursuing this.

Mainly, however, their foreign policy objectives seem weighted towards and focused upon Europe. That's where they see the money and the power being. Also, to the extent that there is a Turkish diaspora, we're seeing the Turkish populations emerge as significant ethnic communities in Europe, particularly France and Germany. So again, that's where the interest goes.

Turkey does have some form of political alliance with Israel, but I've yet to see anything substantial there. It's simply a by-product of both of them being American client states.

Turkey's major geopolitical interest in this fracas is its own security. About a quarter of their population, and the ass end of their country is Kurdish, and they've just fought a decade long Kurdish insurrection which resulted in 40,000 dead Kurds. They are not at all sympathetic to the idea of an autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, which they see as fueling Kurdish nationalism. They would be absolutely opposed to a loose Iraqi Federation, or even worse, a Kurdish state... they see this as a recipe for civil war or dismemberment in their own country.

On this issue, their interests are almost diametrically opposed to those of Israel, which wants to see a decentralized or broken up Iraq (which would not pose any security threat).

Their interests are, instead, convergent with Iran and Syria, both of which also have restless Kurdish minorities. If it comes to a real showdown, Turkey will move towards the Iranians, Syrians and Shia, and strongly against the Kurds... and if necessary against Israel and the United States.

But frankly, its not an option that appeals to them. They don't get along with the Syrians or Iranians, they are an American client, they're okay with Israel. So no matter what happens, they would have to cut across the grains no matter which stand they took.

So the Turkish foreign policy here has been to maintain a sort of de facto neutrality, while professing overt loyalty to the U.S. They aren't going to get involved if they can help it, their principal goal is to keep the Kurds down, so they're doing this very careful dance with Washington.

In our terms, this translates into maddening ambivalence. First the Turks are going to help us invade Iraq, second front, rah rah rah. Then it falls through. Then the Turks are going to send 10,000 peacekeeping soldiers to the coalition, rah rah rah. Then it falls through. That's going to keep on happening.

Meanwhile, we're seeing a very quiet series of diplomatic initiatives with Syria, and I suspect, there is a thawing of relations with Iran. Will anything come of this? Unknown. The Turks are just opening up their options, making sure they've got bridges built all over the place, without actually intending to cross any of those bridges.

Finally, for the Turks, the best outcome would be if they could get their hands on the Iraqi northern oil fields. They could really use control of a major oil field to their own advantage. Unfortunately, that kind of aggressive conquest is a no go, it could seriously complicate their European initiative, and the place is full of Kurds so you'd guarantee yet another uprising and nasty low intensity war. So they'll daydream about the Mosul oil fields, but they're not inclined to do anything about it, unless circumstances pitch it straight into their laps.

Posted by: Valdron at June 2, 2004 12:35 PM

I think they are suffering an acute form of Dutch disease, and they are just about to get another dose:

- first comes the unexpected (or at least unbudgeted) windfall. You suddenly have A LOT of money to throw around. Flashy consumption, white-elephant prestige projects and more distribution of gifts to the population. People do not need to work, you bring immigrants from Asia to do the menial jobs, everybody's happy.

- it this lasts enough, the distribution of gifts continues and becomes an entitlement. Nobody works, spends like crazy, everydody forgetting how life was before.

- prices bump down. Not to worry, it's temporary, nothing that a little bit of debt won't solve. These nice European bankers, bending over to throw money at us, after all we are rich!

- prices stay down. Ouch! You cannot stop the gift giving, so more debt. Maybe a few white elephants are quietly shelved. A few new fighter planes are delayed.

- prices bump up. Ahhh. Told you it was temporary. Quick, more gifts to stifle any complaints.

- price suddenly go back down (and remember, this is only in relative terms. Prices falling from 50 to 30 in 4 years time does the same); Ouch!!. Debt is becoming unreasonable... let's kick out a few of those wothless foreigners (or pay them less) and maybe cut some of the gifts... More money to anti-riot police might be a good idea, who knows... and let's have the morality police roam the streets to prevent too much conspicuous consumption...

You get the drift. If prices now keep on going up, which is a real possibility today, then that cycle go start once anew. There will be downward bumps, irrespective of the absolute price level. Each price increase tears the traditional values of society and its work ethic; each price decrease creates discontent, social tensions, religious blowback and now terrorism. And as someone pointed out, the throne is almost up for grabs.

The cycle started on 9/11 will end in Riyad, I am convinced of that.

I won't contest that Turkey will/would be a mouthful for Europe but do consider the following:

- it's 15 years off even in the best case. In the meantime, they - and they alone have to do all the work of adapting to our rule book. we'll help, we'll pay for stuff, but essentially they have to pull themselves by the bootstraps - and that's the nice thing with the EU: it forces/incites you make efforts in the right direction FOR YOURSELF.

- in the meantime, the 10 new countries will have grown beyond recognition, as they have in the past 15 years, and they will be able to contribute to the EU's muscle, as Spain, Ireland and Portugal do now. The effort then to support Turkey would be spread more widely.

- re immigration. Spain and Portugal (and Ireland) showed that people go BACK when their countries are going right. Expect the same with Central Europe in the coming years, and with Turkey when its turn comes. Hell, it's probably better anyway to have legal immigration than to have prostitution rings and other large scale human trafficking (I have calculated recently that approx 10% (yes, ten) of all Ukrainian women in the 20-30 age range have gone into prostituion in Western Europe, if you can imagine that.)

Basically, we help them help themselves. The important thing is the institutions, the rule of lax (with full recourse to Brussels (European Commission), Luxembourg (European Court) and Strasbourg (European Court for Human Rights, of which Turkey is already a party through the Council of Europe, and whose decisions Turkey usually enforces, sort of, already). And these are the themes that will be watched over, the Copenhagen criteria. The economics stuff, in a sense, is not as important. Never forget, the EU is a political project, not an economic union. The economics stuff was used to lure people in but it's never been at the very core of the project. The Brits have been fighting with this notion right form the start, because politically, they are not in. And please discount significantly all articles you may read in the English-speaking press about how France and Germany are hopelessly weak economically, and do not call the shots in Europe anymore, etc... It's in English!!! Chirac is a catastrophe, but he'll be gone eventually. Vi Vill rride to victorry yet...

The next enlargement (that's my French imperialist streak coming out again) will be the Mediterranean bassin. The issues will be the same: can we improve their governance through the lure of prosperity and the soft touch of our perceived weakness (declining, decadent, hopeless military, always bickering internally)? It is the only win-win solution for the region, so there is yet hope. I hope to live to see it, basically...

In France, we have both May 8 and November 11 as days of rememberance of the two world wars. Both are public holidays. There usually are ceremonies to honor the dead by the unknown soldier's tomb in Paris and by every village's monument aux morts, which usually lists the names of all the village's dead during these wars. Every single village has his, and in some of them, you have the same names over and over again, whole families slaughtered (mostly in La Grande Guerre.)

It's always a very restrained ceremony, with no militarist undertones at all. More and more, the ceremonies involve the presence of Germans or other countries; it's more a reminder of past horror than anything else.

You also have All Saints on November 1, also called day of the dead, where it is traditional to go to the cemetery to remember the lost ones in your family (but not specifically deaths linked to war).
The most militaristic day probably is Bastille Day (14 July) when you traditionnally have a military parade on the Champs-Elysees.

As I wrote in the previous post, the last two wars have actually cured us pretty thoroughly of any desire to fight, at least with Germany or within Europe. With both nations exhausted and destroyed (France's fighting spirit was quite completely destroyed by "victory" in WWI, Germany needing a second dose because they were still angry with that apparent result and later "settlement" of the war), it was maybe easier to try to build peace, the real kind, instead.

Let's hope that it does not come to that (and Churchill's famous words "America eventually does the right thing, after having exhausted the alternatives" are not reassuring...)

As an aside, please note that having whole city blocs evacuated because a bomb (from either war) has been found during construction work or otherwise is still today a very frequent occurence in most of Northern France and a reminder of how it was then.

I was born in the 70s in Strasbourg, which is in France, but right on the border of Germany. It changed countries five times in the century prior to my birth.

Ever since I've gone to school and learned about WWI and WWII, I could not help marvel at the fact that I could now take my bike and go to the swimming pool in another country, with which we had been at war so many times and so ferociously and I would wonder: will it be my turn, when I am of fighting age? Will I need to go kill my neighbors (or be killed by them)? But it has not happened, and it seems likely that it will not happen in the foreseable future.

So because of that, and because Strasbourg is the home of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe, I will never, ever cease to be a strong supporter of Europe and its institutions that have mow made peace inconceivable between our countries, and that have made our countries close allies and I would even say close friends.

So I am a proud "Old European" and I do hope that we will be able to extend to the rest of the world our eurocrats and rules and stagnation and PEACE.

I honor the American forces and others that came to liberate us and that did play a big role for many years in protecing us from the Soviet Union and making this peace possible.

I eventually did my military service in 1989-90, I served in a tank unit based in Germany (not so far from my home, and less than 200 km from the Iron Curtain) and forces from many of the great democracies (France, Germany, the US, Cananda, UK) would train together to DEFEND our countries (especially Germany and France) from the (luckily then fading) Soviet threat. It was still terrifying: our training was based on the assumption that we would be outnumbered 7 tanks to 1 by the Soviets ; we had a 7 minute life expectancy on the front lines ; death by burning inside a metal box is not very attractive; but thankfully it never came to pass.

Armies are a necessary evil, they should be seen as insurance: something we pay for to avoid something even worse (being defenseless against an outside attack). It should never go beyond this. It is wasted resource that could go to something more useful otherwise. It is time and energy which will never be given back. There is nothing honourable about them except the fact that a small minority of people, usually in their early adult years, is willing to do, on behalf of their community, a job that needs to be done and that can include killing, maiming, being killed or being maimed.

"A weapon is an instrument to make your opponent change his mind". Ultimately, it all comes back to decisions taken by a few. You must have enough weapons to dissuade the others to do you any harm, but you should not so much that he starts worrying about what you can do to him (and starts to protect himslef in ways that threaten you in turn). Without trust, it's inherently unstable, as the nuclear arms race showed its full absurdity. Trust can only be gained by giving it.

The US has done a pretty good job after WW II, at least in Europe, to build or support institutions that promote trust. For this we cannot not be thankful. But why stop to Europe? The rest of the world deserves the same. It deserves trust, not threats.

In our current situation of assymetric threats, we need to focus again on the goal, which is "changing the mind of the opponent". Invading countries and killing people does not help further that goal.

The USA went to war against Iraq because it could (militarily) and because a good chunk of its population was clamoring for or okay with some kind of vengeance after 9/11.

As you honor those that died in your name, do remember that going to war is always a defeat, it means either that you are an aggressor or that you have not convinced your opponent not to attack you. You cannot help the latter, but you should avoid the former, which is also a crime against your own soldiers.

A great post and many moving comments at Billmon's.
I'd like to highlight this one (by "Veteran"):

The more inglorious a thing is the more the practitioners of doublespeak try to present it as a glorious thing.

War is decapitated children and maimed men and women and heaps of blackened corpses and ruined homes, villages, towns and cities. War is shouting people straining to kill other people. War is looting, rape, raids and arrests, beatings and torture. War is bodies found on lonely back roads, in fields, in ditches. War is lips sealed for ever, hearts stopped for all time. War is rage, revenge, grief, retaliation, punishment, fury and heartbreak. War is cursing people dealing out death and misery to screaming people. War is the helpless infants whose birth brought such joy turned to killers and tormentors. War is the blackening of human souls, the withering of humanity, the replacing of other living, loving souls with images of some kind of bestial 'other'. War is widows, widowers, orphans and parents weeping. War is the sound of weeping, of bombs, bullets and spades digging into the earth.

War is a handful of people becoming enriched on the deaths of others. War is a series of lies perpetrated to turn the children of nations into killers. War is crippled limbs, minds and spirits. War is the production of traumatized victims and traumatized perpetrators. War is sold as a collective need but endured as an individual's hell. War is a robber of life, of honor, of humanity, of the love that the dead, maimed and brereaved should have been able to give and to receive.

War is only cheered or revered by absolute idiots, often those who have never seen a shattered corpse, a friend turned killer of innocents or the smoking ruins of a home once filled with love and laughter. War is a poison that courses through time and brings more death and misery to and from the broken and humiliated. War makes decent people become warped and compromises any inner decency they have.

I do not think that tributes and flag waving are appropriate 'reward' for those who have fought in wars, have given their lives or are engaged in conflict today.

Because of what war is and because of what it does to the human spirit the most suitable 'reward' that I can think of is that all pray to their God that mercy and healing be granted to the souls and minds of each child turned killer or supporter of killing who has been sacrificed for business and for lies and who has been killed spiritually by ideologies clashing just as casually and brutally as the lives they have been a part of ending.